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t is, by now, conventional wisdom, that “institutions matter.” Yet, it is not always clear 
exactly how institutions matter. Even less is known about the distributional effects of 
institutional change. This is in part because changes in just one or two specific political institutions 
of any given country are rare and attributing the causal effects of altered outcomes to particular 
institutional origins is tricky. For example, during times of democratic transition, many different 
institutions –often spanning the political, economic, and social spheres– undergo simultaneous 
alterations of their institutional setup, which makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of just 
one of those institutional modifications. Here, we analyze a case that allows us to assess 
systematically the effects of the changes in one core governmental institution on the distribution of 
political power in society. When the constitutional chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court  
(Sala IV) was formed in 1989, all other key political and economic institutions remained constant. 
This scenario enables us to look at the effects of the creation of a new court on the strategies interest 
groups and minority groups have used in their quest to secure their constitutional rights. We argue 
that the new court’s rules have, in fact, had profound consequences. First, the cost of access to the 
court was substantially reduced, which has altered the opportunity for access for groups that were 
previously marginalized from all aspects of Costa Rica’s political process, including the judicial 
route. Second, this broadened access has been reflected in substantially altered policy outcomes.  
The article unfolds as follows: section one lays out our argument in more detail. Section 
two briefly outlines Costa Rica’s political institutions and policy process prior to the creation of 
the Sala IV. Section three examines the role the new court affords previously marginalized 






of the new legal opportunity by socially marginalized and politically weak individuals and 
groups. The conclusion sums up the argument and interprets our findings.  
 
Legislatures, Interest Groups, and Institutional Change 
 
Much of the literature on social movements has employed the notion of political 
opportunity structure to explain why social movements embrace particular strategies in their quest 
to influence policy decisions (for example, Hipsher, 1996; Imig & Tarrow, 1999; Kitschelt, 1998; 
Marks & McAdam, 1999; Tarrow, 1994). According to this argument, both stable and contingent 
factors outline specific opportunity structures (formally and informally) that social movements 
and interest groups can exploit when pursuing their goals. Once the political opportunity structure 
changes, it could be expected that the strategies embraced by movements and groups also change. 
Recently, the rejuvenation of national or supranational courts that many countries experienced 
(frequently as a result of democratization) has opened up a different type of opportunity structure, 
here labeled “legal opportunity” or LO (see Hilson, 2002). In many countries, courts have now 
emerged as active participants in the political process offering new opportunities to individual 
citizens, social movements, interest groups, and indeed, sitting politicians (Stone Sweet, 2002). 
However, outside of the US literature, the role of courts as political actors is still understudied.1  
Where Supreme Courts have been created, reformed, or taken on a more activist role, 
citizens are often able to pursue governmental violations of their rights and to advance their 
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policy agenda through a new legal opportunity.2 Yet, the existence of a constitutional court does 
not automatically translate into success for citizens claiming their rights. According to Charles 
Epp (1998), it is not merely the existence of a LO coupled with activist judges that allows 
individuals and minority groups to pursue their rights agenda successfully. Instead, Epp (1998, p. 
17) argues, “Combining rights consciousness with a bill of rights and a willing and able judiciary 
improves the outlook for a rights revolution, but material support for sustained pursuit of rights is 
still crucial.” That is, in most cases, pursuing the legal option is often a lengthy and costly process 
that requires considerable resources on the part of the plaintiff in order to be successful since a 
rights revolution requires “widespread sustained litigation” (Epp 1998, p. 18). Evaluating the 
Costa Rican case, though, reveals that the resources required to file cases and to be successful are 
largely determined by the specific rules that regulate access to and the procedure of the court. 
Thus, if the new court required legal council, high filing fees, etc, Epp’s observation would hold 
for the Costa Rican court. In that case, the creation of the constitutional court with its activist 
magistrates would allow only well-organized, well-financed groups to successfully pursue their 
agendas, a point that is also made in the social movements literature. As is evident from the cases 
presented here, though, poorly organized groups with no significant financial and organizational 
resources have successfully pursued their rights agenda through a LO in Costa Rica. We argue 
that this is the case because of the specific rules regulating the workings of the new court, and in 
particular the low access costs for filing cases and the opportunity to repeatedly file cases. The 
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resources necessary to pursue the legal path effectively are thus contingent on the rules that guide 
access to and the cost requirements of the court.  
 The question motivating this research is thus twofold. First, we assess how access to the 
new court is regulated in Costa Rica. Second, and related, we look at the consequences of 
broadened access to the new court and link the judicial reform to policy outcomes. We argue that 
the heightened access has led to a subtle, yet fundamental, redistribution of power in society and 
politics, resulting in a decentralization of policy-making power. To highlight the extent of that 
devolution of power we examine previously marginalized groups and individuals, who have 
found a new, low-cost legal opportunity to pursue governmental infringements on their rights and 
to influence the policy-making process. The court has thus granted them a new voice that 
provides them with an opportunity to participate in politics previously effectively foreclosed. 
 Costa Rica is a useful and illustrative case to study the effects on institutional change in 
the case of the new court. While Costa Rica’s political institutions have been very stable since the 
promulgation of the 1949 Constitution, the creation of the constitutional Court in 1989 was the 
first major change in the country’s core political institutions and was not accompanied by any 
other substantial institutional innovation or political or economic changes. Hence, it is possible to 
trace the effects of institutional change for the policy-making and implementation process and 
scrutinize the changing patterns of access for political actors both on the elite and mass level.  
We are not concerned here with the motivations for the creation of the court (see Murillo, 
1994; Wilson & Handberg, 1999), nor with the impact on dominant interest groups, which have 
always had the opportunity to influence the policy process through established channels, such as 
political parties. Instead, we focus on how weak, marginalized actors have adjusted their behavior 





That is not to suggest that established political actors did not also change their strategies or that 
there was no significant shift in the political power distribution among the branches of 
government. Indeed, many business groups have used the new LO and members of the 
Legislative Assembly quickly recognized and protested the limits on their powers presented by 
the new court. A leading PUSC (Partido Unidad Social Cristiana) deputy, Constantino Urcuyo, 
for example notes “the appearance of the Sala IV has put a brake on the abuse of power; it is 
natural that the abusers protest” (1995, p. 46). Here, though, we focus on groups that have 
traditionally had very limited access to policy-making structures in Costa Rica to illustrate the 
extent of the shift in influence on policy making.  
 
Policy-making Prior to Judicial Reform: Restricted Access for Marginalized Groups 
 
Prior to the reform of the Supreme Court, the policy-making process provided scant 
opportunities of access to marginalized groups or individuals. Studies of Costa Rican politics 
generally emphasize the importance of two major political parties, the social democratic Partido 
Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Party, PLN) and the center-right Partido Unidad Social 
Cristiana (Social Christian Unity Party, PUSC).3 They also point to the struggle for policy-
making supremacy between the two popular branches of government: the 57-member Legislative 
Assembly and the executive branch (Booth, 1998; Carey, 1996). Most studies pay little or no
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attention to the role of the Supreme Court.4 Before to the creation of a constitutional chamber 
within the Supreme Court in 1989, this analysis was both an appropriate and accurate rendition of the 
policy-making structure. Costa Rica has held free, open, and honest elections every four years since 
1953. Two major political parties have controlled the presidency and the legislative assembly since that 
date. These parties routinely captured over 90 percent of the presidential vote and alternated control 
over the legislative assembly vote; third parties played only a minor role (Wilson, 1998, pp. 46-48).5 
Minority interests thus remained underrepresented in the party system.  
The Costa Rican presidency is one of the weakest in the hemisphere (Mainwaring & Shugart 
1997, p. 432) while political power is devolved among four branches of government: the executive, 
legislative assembly, Supreme Court, and a quasi-fourth branch, Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones 
(Supreme Tribunal of Elections, TSE). A prohibition on immediate re-election and then (after a 
1969 amendment) a total prohibition on re-election further weakened the President’s influence.6 
While most policy-making power was vested in the legislative assembly, a bar on immediate re-
election of deputies (diputados) diminished their ability to establish their institutional powers or 
create political bailiwicks. Since the end of the civil war, the powers of the popular branches have 
been further eroded by the expansion of existing and newly created autonomous institutions 




 Much of the growing literature on the Supreme Court takes on a legalistic viewpoint (see for 
example the essays in Revista Parlamentaria 1995). Very little is written on the political and 
policy–making impact of the reformed court (Wilson, et al., 2004, Wilson, 1998; Wilson & 
Handberg, 1999; Rodríguez Cordero, 2002a, 2002b; 2003). 
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(Wilson, 1998). Socially marginalized or politically weak groups that lacked easy access to and 
representation by the two dominant political parties were thus effectively locked out of the policy-
making process and their interests were seldom heard or defended.  
 
The Role of the Pre-Reformed Supreme Court  
 
Although the 1949 constitution formally established the Supreme Court as a co-equal 
power with the popular branches of government, it continued to play much the same minor role it 
had under the old constitution. The country’s civil law tradition, as in the rest of Latin America, 
severely constrained Supreme Court magistrates’ actions. Magistrates were highly deferential to 
popularly elected leaders for whom they believed the “power to legislate was absolute” (Urcuyo, 
1995, p. 44). The popular branches consequently governed in the sure knowledge that the court 
would not declare their legislative acts unconstitutional and the Court acted only when laws were 
clearly against the “letter of the law” (Barker, 1991, pp. 362–63).   
Various rules and norms further limited the Court’s willingness or ability to take action 
against popular branches. A very restrictive definition of “standing” (the right to bring a case to 
court) was applied, which limited the number of cases that were brought to court. Compounding 
the situation was a rule requiring a super-majority (two thirds) vote of the Supreme Court’s 
plenum to render a law unconstitutional (Murillo, 1994, p. 19). Supreme Court magistrates, as 
well as being schooled in the Civil Law tradition and its explicit nod to popular branch 
sovereignty, were also generally career judges, all of whom were necessarily inexperienced in 
constitutional issues before they were elected to the high court. Furthermore, all other challenges 





(Ortiz, 1990, p. 41), which was famously slow and inaccessible. This difficulty in declaring 
legislation and acts of the state unconstitutional fostered the Court’s general deference to the 
political branches (Barker, 2000, p. 15). Before the creation of the Sala IV, the Costa Rican 
Supreme Court, like other Latin American courts, played a very minor role in the country’s policy 
debates. Thus, no legal opportunity existed for individual citizens or interest groups to appeal the 
decisions of the government or to have their social and economic rights enforced. This is 
particularly relevant as the constitution itself grants individuals a wide range rights and liberties 
such as the right to life, movement, privacy, association, equality, etc (Constitution Title IV & 
Title V).  
Together with the restricted access to the court, its inactivity, timidity, and slow pace 
discouraged individuals and groups seeking the enforcement of their civil rights or the protection 
of their civil liberties from approaching the Court. Empirical evidence supports this assertion. A 
detailed examination of cases resolved by the pre-reformed Supreme Court shows that Gay 
individuals or groups filed no claims. 7 This, though, might be explained by the relatively recent 
appearance of Gay groups as political actors in Costa Rica, but there were similarly few cases for 
other minority (or politically weak) groups; very few of those filed were successful. For example, 
there was just one case of constitutionality by a person injured at work, but it was rejected on 
April 13, 1965. Claims by workers, including the ones against the quasi-apartheid laws limiting 
people of color from working in certain parts of the country, were routinely rejected. A notable 
success by organized labor was in September 5, 1963 when a claim was filed by the Asociación 
Sindical de Profesores y Funcionarios Universitarios (Unionized Association of Professors and 
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University Employees), denouncing certain compulsory deductions on their salary. The court 
heard only three cases by foreign nationals demanding equal treatment before the law, all other 
claims were denied without a hearing.8 Prior to the creation of the Sala IV, minority parties, 
including the Communist Party (declared illegal after the civil war), failed to have any success at 
the Supreme Court. Thus, the paucity of cases filed with the pre-reformed Supreme Court reflects 
the lack of an effective Legal Opportunity available to interest groups or aggrieved individuals.  
 
Creating a Legal Opportunity 
 
In 1989, the Supreme Court was expanded through the addition of a seven-member 
constitutional chamber (Sala Constitucional or Sala IV); the first major revision of Costa Rica’s 
political institutions since the promulgation of the 1949 constitution. The new court aggressively 
sought cases through major public education campaigns while simultaneously relaxing many of 
the previously rigid legal requirements to file a case. The evidence provided by the cases filed 
illustrates that marginalized groups and individuals can and do use the new court to pursue their 
rights without having to rely on the legislative process. This also means that the need to mobilize 
large numbers of affected people in collective action, for example in demonstrations or mass 
lobbying efforts, effectively disappears. The specific attributes and rules of the court facilitated a 
new legal opportunity for groups previously marginalized in the policy-making process. In 
particular, the regulations allowing for free and general access to the Court have meant that those 
groups and individuals that would otherwise be precluded from taking advantage of the country’s 
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legal structures are now in a position to do so. These rules, together with the previously established 
political and financial independence of the judiciary (Wilson, et al., 2004), allows for political 
actors without privileged access to the legislative process to effectively pursue their rights and 
thereby downplays the importance of resources emphasized by Epp (1998). 
Access to the Sala IV is both easy and inexpensive. Litigants need no lawyers, no filing 
fees, no understanding of the legal nature of their claim; except for cases of unconstitutionality. 
Unlike the pre-reformed court, legal standing is now very broadly defined and allows any 
individual in the country to present a claim 24 hours a day and 365 days a year. Claims can be 
written in any language and on anything; it is the task of court employees to analyze and classify 
the cases by type. This process reduces the need for significant resources to pursue a judicial 
strategy. And, in a departure from the country’s traditional reliance on Civil Code, the new 
court’s rulings establish precedent that must be followed by all other courts and applied to all 
similar situations, which reduces the need for cases to be filed multiple times. As a direct 
consequence, the number of cases brought to the court increased exponentially; in the court’s first 
full year of operation 2,296 cases were filed, which increased to more than 13,000 in 2003 
producing a total caseload of over 114,000 (1989-2003). This rapid increase in caseload illustrates 
the recognition on the part of citizens that this new LO was an efficacious means through which 
to resolve disputes and affect policy. The appeal of the court as a LO was enhanced by the court’s 
concerted effort to reduce the time to resolve cases; in 1994 average case duration was 9 months 
and 3 days, by 2002 it was just 2 months and 3 days (Proyecto Estado de la Nación en Desarrollo 
Humano Sostenible, 2003, p. 430). It is against this background that marginalized groups used the 






The Use of the New Legal Opportunity by Gays and PLWA 
 
Prior to the creation of the Sala IV, gays and people living with AIDS (PLWA) had been 
strikingly unsuccessful in obtaining their rights. Gay rights and the rights of PLWA were either 
ignored at best or trampled on by government agents. Neither of the major political parties 
championed the agenda of either group and their inability to engage in collective action meant 
that other political opportunities were effectively closed to them. 
While these two groups have some common interests, they have distinct emphases. Gay-
rights groups have generally sought legal “equality” with the rest of society and an end to 
discrimination, while PLWA groups are more concerned with access to anti-retroviral 
medications and the quality of medical and insurance coverage. These two groups are similarly 
disadvantaged in terms of pursuing their collective interests since many PLWAs and gay people 
do not wish to be publicly associated with these groups, due to a real fear of discrimination or 
stigmatization (R. Stern, interview, November 19, 1999). Consequently, Gays and PLWA in 
Costa Rica are poorly organized politically and unable to engage in effective collective action.  
These difficulties were compounded by the short life and small membership of all AIDS 
and gay organizations in Costa Rica. The original gay and AIDS organizations sprang up in the 
1980s and 1990s in response to police raids on gay and lesbian bars and in response to the AIDS 
crisis. But these groups invariably experienced short-lived existences. Currently, only the Centro 
de Investigación y Promoción para América Central de Derechos Humanos (Center for the 
Investigation and Promotion of Human Rights for Central America, CIPAC), founded in 1999, 
and the Asociación Agua Buena Prodefensa de los Derechos Humanos (Agua Buena Association 





Buena, 2003).9 The ability of gays to organize and create associations to pursue their agenda was 
further hampered by the state’s Registro Nacional, which refused to allow gay and lesbian 
associations to register their organizations and give them a legal presence until 1996 (ILGA, 1999).  
The problems in the pursuit of their agendas were made worse by the social 
marginalization of gays and PLWA. Thus, an examination of the success or failure of these two 
groups’ use of the new LO demonstrates the changes in Costa Rica’s political landscape due to the 




According to Francisco Madrigal, president of the now defunct Costa Rican Gay rights 
organization Asociación Triángulo Rosa (Pink Triangle Association), homophobia is “deeply rooted 
in all Central American societies” resulting in discrimination and violence against gays (Espinoza, 
1998). Madrigal’s assertions are supported by Lind (1997), who documents the extent and 
consequences of Latin American homophobia including a general rise in violence against sexual 
minorities.  
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Although homosexuality is legal in Costa Rica, gays are still subject to extensive social 
discrimination and anti-gay violence especially at the hands of Chapulines street gangs.10 Indeed, 
in a 1999 poll conducted by UNIMER, 83.4 percent of Costa Ricans interviewed stated that 
homosexuality was never justified. This was a higher negative score than people’s views on the 
use of violence (82.8 percent) and abortion (80.4 percent), both of which are criminal activities in 
Costa Rica (UNIMER, 1999). This appraisal reflects a deeply held anti-gay sentiment in Costa 
Rica, which hampers their ability to muster popular support for their agenda or support from 
political parties.11 Political scientist Jacobo Schifter states that as a result of social discrimination, 
“most gays would rather resign” from their job than be publicly identified as being gay 
(Carstensen, 1992, p. 36). Indeed, according to Stern (1999, p. 3), “hundreds of gay people are 
fired each year when their employers discover their sexual identity.” Gays fired from their jobs for 
being gay were rarely willing to challenge the decision for fear of being exposed as gay. 
Consequently, gay rights did not appear on the political radar before the creation of the Sala IV.  
In 1997, when national newspapers reported three gay hotels were promoting prostitution 
and sex tourism, the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (Costa Rican Institute of Tourism, ICT) 
declined to investigate the veracity of the claims and instead began to look into ways to close the 
hotels (ILGA, 1999). According to Schifter (2000), the police are generally unsympathetic to gay 
victims of crime and for police officers most gays are “perverts who have chosen to embark on a 
life of crime, the same way that burglars have learned to steal.” And, as one police officer states, 
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“Nobody is born with an inclination to steal. The same is true of drugs and homosexuality” 
(Schifter, 2000, p. 152). Until the late 1980s, San José police routinely harassed and arrested 
patrons of gay bars (Schifter, 1989). There was little state protection of gays’ safety. 
The major political parties, for their part, have traditionally kept their distance from nascent 
gay organizations and, when in government, have even permitted some state institutions to foster 
a hostile environment for gays, including open discrimination. For instance, in 1990, immigration 
authorities threatened to deport gays and lesbians arriving in the country for a conference 
(Carstensen, 1992, p. 36). The pervasiveness of anti-gay feelings has often been fermented and 
fostered by government officials and church leaders. Even in the late 1990s, President Miguel 
Ángel Rodríguez Echeverría (PUSC 1998-2002) advocated the cancellation of an international gay 
and lesbian festival that was to be held in Costa Rica. The Archbishop of San José, Román Arrieta 
Villalobos, echoed his sentiment by urging his congregation to block the festival by any legal 
means. The festival was cancelled. Weeks later, 300 villagers of Sardinal de Carrillo, Guanacaste, 
led by local priests and politicians, blockaded a road to prevent gay tourists from going to a resort 
hotel frequented by gays (La Nación, October 25, 1998).12 
Gays have taken recourse to the legal avenue more frequently since the introduction of the 
Sala IV, even though they have not always been successful in their appeals to the Supreme Court 
(see Table One). In 1998, for example, the Asociación Triángulo Rosa sued Román Arrieta 
Villalobos, the Archbishop of San José, and President Rodríguez for statements they made in the 
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national media against a proposed Costa Rican gay and lesbian festival. The Archbishop was found 
not guilty on the basis that he had spoken in accordance with the Catholic Church’s doctrine on 
homosexuality.13  
 
[Table One about here] 
 
The Sala IV has rejected many other gay rights cases usually due to a lack of evidence. 
For example, in 1993 when the Minister of Security Luis Fishman stated gays would not be 
allowed to serve in the policy force, a case was filed with the Sala IV. The court rejected the case 
(Resolution No. 1099-93) arguing the minister had only made a statement rather than implemented an 
administrative act. The Sala IV noted that it would only accept cases against actual administrative 
acts (M. Castillo, interview, November 19, 1999). Similarly, in 1998, a case was filed against the 
Ministry of Education and a private school claiming a teacher was fired for being gay. This case 
was rejected, as were other similar cases, due to a lack of evidence that the teacher was dismissed 
specifically for being gay, rather than some other reason.  
There have, though, been some notable successes that would not have been possible 
before the creation of the Sala IV. An important early success for gays was the ending of police 
harassment. In 1994, a gay bar owner filed a case with the Sala IV against the police for unlawful 
arrest and abuse of authority. The Sala IV ruled in favor of the bar owner and, in addition, 
mandated the police be trained in how to deal with gays and transvestites (Resolution No. 4732-94), 
which effectively put an end to the police raids and significantly curtailed the general harassment 
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of gays. Since that ruling the court has indicated its unwillingness to accept cases by anti-gay 
groups or individuals who wish to use the Court to block lawful meetings. For example, it 
rejected a claim that a gay festival would infringe on the fundamental rights of the appellants 
(Resolution No. 3808-98). 
Another significant early success was in 1995 when Abraxas, a small group created to 
fight discrimination against gays and PLWA, petitioned the Registro de Asociaciones to become 
the first openly gay association to receive legal recognition from the state. Their request was 
denied by the Registro. The group immediately approached the newly created Ombudsman’s 
office (Defensor de los Habitantes) and threatened legal action at the Sala IV. The Registro 
backed down and allowed the group to register, which opened the door for all subsequent Gay 
groups to gain legal recognition. 
More recently, the public debate concerning Gay rights was reopened and taken to a new 
level when an Alajuela city family judge refused a marriage license to Yashin Castrillo Fernández 
to marry his same-sex partner (Expediente No. 03-400952-292-FA). Castrillo Fernández immediately 
appealed the decision to the Sala IV (Expediente No. 03-008127-007-CO). In an August 2003 
vote (9237-03), the Sala IV agreed to examine article 14 of the Código de Familia (Family Law) 
and to take the unusual step of holding public hearings on the issue of gay marriage before 
making a final ruling (Angulo, 2003). 
 The interesting point of these cases, though, is that gays, either individually or through 
nascent organizations, have frequently used the court to attempt to further their agenda. Contrary 
to Epp’s (1998) expectations, then, it is possible for poorly organized, under-funded gay groups to 
win court protection for their constitutional rights through the LO. Even though not all cases have 





individuals to quickly file another case directly with the constitutional court and without incurring 
large financial costs or the need to mobilize large numbers of supporters for collective action. 
 
People Living with AIDS (PLWA) 
 
The challenge to claim their rights is still more difficult for people living with AIDS 
(PLWA). Victims of AIDS are stigmatized and frequently considered unsympathetic sufferers for 
two related reasons. First, they carry a contagious fatal disease, which is often believed to be a 
consequence of “morally questionable” activities, such as sexual promiscuity, prostitution, or 
illegal drug use. Secondly, many PLWA belong to another socially marginalized and politically 
disorganized group, homosexuals. While AIDS is not a “gay disease,” it is often mistakenly 
viewed as such. In Costa Rica, this view is furthered by the fact that an estimated 64 percent of 
people identified as HIV-positive are gay (Espinoza, 1998). Thus, the social and political 
marginalization of gays is compounded for PLWA, which in turn makes undertaking political 
action to defend their individual rights hugely difficult. According to one AIDS activist, 
Guillermo Murillo, organizing PLWA is difficult, “because once symptoms of AIDS appear, the 
focus of people’s attention is usually in trying to survive and keeping the fact secret. The disease 
strikes such crippling blows to self-esteem and emotional stability of most its victims that they are 
almost psychologically unable to advocate for themselves” (Stern, 1998). Ignorance of and hostility 
toward PLWA was rife even in the medical community. For example, the laboratory director for the 
Hospital Calderón Guardia, a central social security hospital in San José, refused to conduct 





accepted a writ of amparo by a PLWA and forced the hospital to treat AIDS patients the same way 
as any other patient (Resolution No. 3001-97). 
 One consequence of this hostility toward PLWA, then, is a great deal of pressure for them 
to keep their identities secret and not to join a protest group to pursue changes in public policy 
through official political channels because the social consequences, feared or real, are very high. 
In addition, the chances of finding a strategic ally promoting their interests in politics are thin. 
According to a Tico Times editorial (September 26, 1997), many AIDS patients refused to 
acknowledge publicly their medical condition as it “would push them into the spotlight. Given the 
choice of death or admitting they had AIDS, time and time again, they chose death.” While the 
social costs of engaging in political activity are potentially high, any benefits from successful 
political activity would be public goods, available to all PLWA. These factors result in apparently 
insurmountable collective action problems.  
A fundamental interest of all PLWA is the ability to gain access to anti-retroviral 
medications. From the earliest days of the AIDS crisis in the 1980s, PLWA were unable to 
receive these medications through the government-controlled health care system. Furthermore, 
they were denied care from government-owned hospital laboratories and received no protection 
from discrimination in employment or other areas. It was not until the 1990s that small, under-
funded AIDS groups began to appeal to the Sala IV. The use of the new LO allowed this diverse 
and disparate group of individuals to overcome their collective action problems, their lack of 
resources, and their social and political marginalization to pursue substantial parts of their 
agendas. The need to create political support structures, change societal, or muster massive levels 





The creation of the Sala IV, though, did not automatically produce rulings in favor of PLWA’s 
demands to gain access to appropriate medicine and an end to discrimination. Indeed, soon after 
the creation of the Sala IV, AIDS activist Jacobo Schifter filed a writ of amparo. Then, 18 months 
later in 1992, the Sala IV accepted the argument of the state’s national health care agency Caja 
Costarricense del Seguro Social (CCSS) and ruled against the case (Resolution No. 280-92). The 
CCSS argued that the anti-AIDS drug, AZT, would not “cure” patients of AIDS, but would result 
only in a “prolonged course of deterioration” (Stern & Matamoros 1999, p. 17).  
In 1996, an American psychologist Richard Stern organized a small number of his clients, 
who were persons living with AIDS, into a “Patients’ Coalition.” This small group discussed 
alternative strategies to obtain the newest anti-retroviral drugs. With the 1992 failure of a judicial 
strategy, the group was hesitant to approach the Sala IV. Many of the members believed that a 
second loss at the Supreme Court would “close the door to future negotiations with the 
government” (Stern, 1999, p. 4; R. Stern & G. Murillo Interviews November 19, 1999). For the first 
year the group negotiated with pharmaceutical companies for subsidized drugs and attempted a 
dialogue with the relevant government officials to pay for those drugs (Jiménez, 1997; Stern, 
1998). The group failed to secure donated medicines from the pharmaceutical companies who 
argued, “we are an industry: we cannot fund this type of treatment” (Ávalos, 1997). But the group 
was also unsuccessful with its traditional lobbying efforts of government agencies. Stern (1999: 
4) concludes that it “became apparent that the health care officials had no intention of providing 
[anti-AIDS] medications to anyone.”  
After a year without any success, a new group was formed with representatives of PLWA 
and representatives of various NGOs working on health issues in Costa Rica. In August 1997, the 





fourth person was added to the writ, William García, a critically ill AIDS patient (Expediente No. 
5778-V-97; M. Castillo, personal communication, March 11, 2000). García’s doctors provided 
documentation arguing that the drugs were his only possibility for survival, thus making the case one 
of “life or death.” In the subsequent weeks the court’s clerks and newspapers were “bombarded” with 
information concerning García’s declining condition and impressing on the court the need for a 
speedy and favorable resolution.14 As in 1992, executive president of CCSS, Álvaro Salas, argued 
against the provision of anti-retroviral drugs noting their inability to cure the patients. Furthermore, he 
claimed issuing of the drugs would be “financially impossible” at an estimated cost of $800 per month 
per patient (Tico Times, September 26, 1997: 12; Ávalos 1997).  
Within three weeks of the filing of the case, the Sala IV ruled in favor of the provision of 
free, anti-retroviral drugs to all AIDS patients in Costa Rica (Resolution No. 5934-97). The 
constitutional basis of the court’s decision lies in Article 21, which states “life is inviolable.” The 
court reasoned, “What good are the rest of the rights and guarantees, the institutions and their 
programs, the advantages and benefits of our system of liberties, if a person cannot count on the 
right to life and health assured?” By the end of 1998, more than 400 AIDS patients gained free access 
to the anti-retroviral medicines (Stern, 1999, p. 4).15 Even though Costa Rica has a civil law legal 
tradition, cases that are decided by the Sala IV carry the weight of precedent; all other similar cases 
must follow the same legal reasoning as original case decision. Thus, the low costs of appealing to 
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 M. Castillo, interview, November 19, 1999. This version of events was corroborated by 
Supreme Court Letrado (clerk) C. Hess, interview November 15, 1999. 
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 Although access was immediate for the four people named in the ruling, the CCSS was slow to 
extend the rule to all PLWA. Another 30 cases were filed before the precedent was acknowledged 





the Sala IV and the favorable decision precluded the need for other individuals to appear before the 
court and risk being publicly identified as HIV-positive.  
Table Two illustrates the profound legal impact of the 1997 AIDS ruling. In response to 
the ruling, other groups of chronically ill people used the same strategy to have the state guarantee 
and pay for their medications. Within two years of the AIDS ruling, the Sala IV ruled in favor of 
the free provision of medications for 15 other chronic diseases including cancer, epilepsy, and 
multiple sclerosis (Ávalos & Méndez, 1999). The court has since ruled in favor of free 
medications for two types of incurable sclerosis, which are even more costly than the treatment 
for AIDS. More recently, four liver disease patients won a court ruling, using the same legal 
argument as in the AIDS case, to require the CCSS to continue a liver transplant program 
(Resolution No. 7532-04; Ávalos, 2004). As in gay rights cases, the court is less supportive of 
PLWA’s discrimination cases due to the difficulty of proving motivation. 
 




Another historically marginalized group that has employed the new LO to force the state 
to recognize and uphold its existing constitutionally guaranteed rights is organized labor. After a 
brief period of significant political influence before the Civil War, unions were systematically and 
severely weakened. The largest unions sided with the losing side of the war and consequently, 
successive governments engineered legal rules to weaken unions’ strength. The impact of these 





very low (7 percent). While public sector unions enjoy higher membership levels (60 percent), 
various laws and decrees have curtailed their organizational powers (Wilson, 1998, pp. 69-70). 
Restrictions on union strength included a prohibition on strike actions by public unions and a refusal 
to protect union leaders from employers’ reprisals. A major weakening of unions came from the broad 
interpretation of the 1943 Código de Trabajo (Labor Code) and its expansive definition of “public 
workers.” The Labor Code, originally written to strengthen unions’ political and economic power, 
removed the right to strike from more than 70 percent of the entire labor force (Villalobos, 1998). 
While the constitution guarantees the right to strike (Article 60 & 61), the Labor Code limits that right 
to non-public sector workers.  
Since the creation of the Sala IV, labor unions have used the new LO in two different 
ways: first, to strengthen their organizational repertoire and regain the right to employ the strike 
option, and second, unions used the court’s new power of constitutional review to challenge 
economic policies that might harm their members’ interests. 
Unions had a long history of lobbying governments to revise the Labor Code. Their 
strategy included eliciting international pressure from the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) and the AFL-CIO. Yet, after fifty years of futile political pressure to change the Labor 
Code, four public sector unions jointly filed a case of unconstitutionality with the Sala IV. 
Eventually, the Sala IV accepted the unions’ arguments and declared unconstitutional articles 376 
a, b, e, and article 389 paragraph 2 of the Labor Code (Resolution No. 1317-98). As a result, the 
vast majority of workers regained their right to strike in support of their goals (Villalobos, 1998). 
A second use of the new LO by organized labor has been to block, delay, or reverse 
unfavorable government policies by challenging them at the Sala IV. A pertinent example is the case 





supply cellular phone service in Costa Rica. Public sector unions, representing phone workers, feared 
this was the first step toward privatizing the whole telephone industry and would result in job 
losses and poorer working conditions. In 1993, the Sala IV resolved the issue in ruling the contracts 
unconstitutional. Cellular phones were deemed a type of telephone service, which, as the unions had 
argued, was a constitutionally mandated monopoly granted to the state phone company, ICE. 
 
Other groups and individuals 
 
Another weakly organized and socially marginalized group that has also successfully 
employed the new LO is prisoners. Prison overcrowding has been an ongoing problem for several 
years, but politicians generally ignored the issue. In 1996, the Sala IV accepted a case filed by a 
prisoner, Marvin Guevara Cerrera, and gave the La Reforma prison one year to provide minimally 
acceptable conditions for prisoners (Resolution No. 4576-96). The prison made an effort to 
address the problem, but a 1999 United Nations agency inspection found the jail was 139 percent 
above its intended capacity. In August 2000, the Sala IV revisited the issue of jail overcrowding 
and ruled that no more prisoners were to be set to the San Sebastián jail until minimum UN 
requirements for the treatment of prisoners were met (Resolution No. 7484-00). In response to this 
ruling the government funded the development of five new prison facilities and the renovation of 
several others (U.S. Department of State 2001).  
Other cases highlight the lack of attention the Legislative Assembly paid to the Supreme 
Court in general and individual constitutional rights in particular prior to the existence of the Sala IV. 
For example, in 1985, a Costa Rican court convicted a journalist for practicing journalism without 





case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. That international court ruled that Article 13 
of the American Human Rights Convention (to which Costa Rica is a signatory) declares an 
individual’s right to free speech and thus to freely practice journalism. However, the Costa Rican 
government viewed the ruling as advisory and not binding. It took another ten years and the 
creation of the Sala IV before the journalist won his case and mandatory licensing of journalists 
was declared unconstitutional (Resolution No. 2313-95). Subsequently, the Sala IV made it explicit 
that it expected the Costa Rican government to live up to its international treaty obligations. This 
was powerfully illustrated in early 2003 when the Sala IV rejected the Pacheco (PUSC 2002-) 
government’s attempt to reduce education expenditures by reducing the school year. The Sala IV 
declared the administration’s decision to cut 27 days form the school year was unconstitutional. It 
argued the administration must comply with all international agreements signed by current or 
previous Costa Rican governments including the Convenio Centroamericano sobre la Unificación 
de la Educación Básica, which promised a minimum of 200 days in the academic year for Costa 
Rican students (Resolution No. 11515-02).  
Another illustrative example of the open, low cost access to the Sala IV comes from a 10 
year-old boy, Oscar Felipe Baltodano Valverde, who was routinely late for school due to the 
tardiness of the school bus that served his poor neighborhood. His writ of amparo was hand-
written and filed without legal council. It claimed the bus company was impinging on his 
constitutional right to a free education. Although the court rejected this particular case, the bus 
company responded positively to his claim. Over the next eight years, Oscar Felipe filed over 140 
cases, winning some and losing others. Although he has no legal training and no resources, he 
now acts as an unpaid legal defender for his poor neighborhood. He is facilitating the use of an 





instead seek solutions from the Court (interview, Baltodano, July 6, 2004; Mastroeni, 1999; Mora, 
2000).  
Prior to the creation of the Sala IV, none of these classes of individuals or groups 
(journalists, school children, labor unions, or poor, marginalized people) were in a position to 
protect their constitutional rights effectively. But with the opening of a LO through the Sala IV, 
they could challenge the decisions of the popular branches, government agencies, and other 
individuals and efficiently pursue their agenda without the need to mobilize vast resources or 
organize collective actions. 
 
Implications of the cases: new legal opportunities and political outcomes 
 
 How can we explain that marginalized groups in Costa Rica have been able to fight 
successfully for their constitutional rights when, in some cases, they had tried to do so for decades 
without success? An obvious answer is the creation of the new constitutional court. Yet, 
according to existing literature, new courts can only be used effectively if those pushing for their 
rights have substantial resources to engage in the legal access. Contrary to this expectation, in the 
Costa Rican case, many of the groups and individuals that have used the new court are poorly 
organized and often cannot marshal significant resources. The answer, then, has to be found in the 
particular rules guiding access to the court. Whereas previous studies have concentrated on cases 
where substantial resources were indeed necessary to use the courts, the Costa Rican court 
removes these barriers and is effectively open to all citizens regardless of their resources.  
Enforcing rights was also possible because similar to many Latin American constitutions, 





guarantees (Title IV & Title V). Thus, the protection of the rights that homosexuals, PLWA, and 
other minority groups were seeking was already implicitly, if not explicitly, enumerated in the 
constitution. Yet prior to the creation of the court, no readily available option was available to any 
group, especially not poorly organized, socially marginalized ones to claim these rights. 
Assessing the strategy and success or failure of these groups answers the fundamental question of 
how highly marginalized groups managed to assert their rights in a society that did not recognize 
their rights. And, in the case of PLWA, it shows how such a group managed to force the state to 
use a significant part of its declining budget to pay for expensive anti–retroviral drugs to treat 
them, effectively making them a public good available to all PLWA even though only four people 
took the case to the court.  
The new rules allowing for open access by individuals and groups previously 
marginalized from representing their interests in the political arena have had a profound impact 
on Costa Rican politics and society. In particular, new groups and individuals have now increased 
their political presence and power and are better able to defend their constitutionally granted 
rights. Other less atomized and socially marginalized groups can be expected to also be 
successful. In essence, interest groups, social movements, and also individuals can pursue a new, 
low-cost strategy that fundamentally alters Costa Rica’s political dynamics.  
Table Three contains a partial list of cases filed by weakly organized groups, broken down 
by appellant, that have been taken to the Sala IV. Clearly, various minority groups have taken 
advantage of the LO afforded by the Sala IV to pursue their agendas. While the list shows that not 
all cases were successful, it also hints at the relatively low cost and ease of following such a legal 
strategy. If a case fails, it is possible to file another similar case shortly afterwards without having to 





challenged. But if the case is successful, the precedent allows all groups and individuals in similar 
positions to benefit from the ruling. 
 
[Table Three about here] 
 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated how the establishment of a constitutional court, 
the Sala IV, in Costa Rica, has exerted a profound impact on the country’s policy-making process. 
Previously marginalized groups as well as individuals have gained cheap and effective access to 
the court, thus being able to ensure their rights vis-à-vis the government. This process has had far-
reaching implications. Most evidently, the policy-making autonomy that the government had 
enjoyed since 1949 has been severely curtailed as its policies are now subjected to the court’s 
interpretation of their constitutionality. On a different level, though, the distribution of power in 
Costa Rica has been profoundly altered. Social movements and interest groups have been 
empowered, filtering power to some strata of society that oftentimes were politically marginalized 
prior to the creation of the Sala IV. In effect, the political system in Costa Rica has become more 
open through the establishment of a new court with respect to the protection of minority rights. 
The existence of the new legal opportunity means that as a strategy, the development of an 
extensive lobbying system might be less important and necessary since groups and individuals 
can now claim their rights without recourse to the legislative path. Finally, it can be observed that 
the strategies and behaviors of political actors both on the elite and mass level have adjusted to 
the changing institutions, in particular the new legal opportunity. While other strategies, such as 





benefited particularly those social groups for which collective action presented a sizable problem, 
such as gays, PLWA, or prisoners’ rights groups.  
 More generally, the way in which marginalized groups in Costa Rica have approached 
and relied on a new legal opportunity to pursue their agendas may also throw light on the 
behavior of similar groups in other countries. In the case of PLWA, for example, the model used in 
Costa Rica has been consciously replicated in other Central American countries including El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Panama. In Panama PROBSIDA (Foundation for the Well-being and 
Dignity of People with AIDS) used a two-pronged strategy negotiating with the relevant state 
health care agencies and threatening to file a case with the Supreme Court (Stern, 1998). Similar 
strategies have also been pursued in a variety of other countries including the UK (using the 
European Court of Justice) and in South Africa (BBC, 2002) through the Supreme Court to force 
the government to fund Aids treatment.16 All these cases provide ample material to further 
investigate the effects of institutional change—in particular, reform of the judicial system—on 
political behavior and distribution of power in democratic societies.  
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Table 1: Selected cases involving gay rights 
Ruling No.a Argued in the Case Outcome 
1099-93 Against public anti-gay declarations of the Minister of Security Lost 
4732-94 Police brutality at a gay discotheque Won 
1942-97 Anti-gay policies at “La Reforma” jail Lost 
3808-98 Right to have a Gay festival in Costa Rica Won 
4016-98 Student expelled from school for being gay Lost 
9237-03 Agreed to examine the Family Law concerning same sex marriage Won 
Source: Corte Suprema de Justicia-Sala Constitucional. 2004. 
a. Case’s resolution number; the two numerals after the hyphen signify the year of the decision. 
 
Table 2: Selected PLWA and other related cases 
Ruling No.a Argued in the Case Outcome 
280-92 Access to medical treatment for people with AIDS Lost 
5934-97 Access to medical treatment for people with AIDS Won 
3001-97 Calderón Guardia Hospital refused lab tests for people with AIDS Won 
3024-98 Job discrimination against person with multiple sclerosis Lost 
5788-98 Right to die without pain Won 
4119-00 Against CCSS (social security agency) fired worker for having AIDS Lost 
9737-00 Worker fired for having multiple sclerosis Won 
1432-03 Right for a Medical Doctor to work in a latex–free environment Won 
7532-04 CCSS shall continue the Liver’s Transplant Program for Adult Patients Won 
Source: Corte Suprema de Justicia-Sala Constitucional. 2004. 
a. Case’s resolution number; the two numerals after the hyphen signify the year of the decision. 
 
Table 3: Major Cases Filed with the Sala IV by Minorities, Marginalized Groups, and Individuals 
Ruling No.a  Argued in the Case Outcome 
 Accommodating disabled people  
567-90 No Braille exams for blind people the Civil Service evaluations. Won 
6732-98 Television networks did not translate programs into sign Language. Won 
5792-01 Newscasts lack translation into sign language. Won 
8450-00 Schools lack oral tests for the blind.  Lost (c) 
10826-00 Academic modification to indicate a student’s “special needs” was 
marked on the Diploma.  
Won 





Table 3 (continued) 
11050-01 Handicapped are not permitted to enroll in courses from the Sports 
Coliseum at Heredia. 
Lost (c) 
 Access for disabled people  
4543-99 CCSS (social security agency) lacks adequate facilities for 
handicapped people. 
Won 
235-00 Public fences along sidewalks of San José cause problems for 
handicapped people. 
Won 
2305-00 Judicial Branch Buildings lack secure access for Handicapped 
people. 
Won 
2494-00 Installation of public fences on San José sidewalks; causes serious 
problems for blind people. 
Lost (c) 
7085-00 IMAS (social assistance state agency) lacks appropriate installations 
for handicapped people. 
Won 
8422-00 Educational Institutions lacks appropriate installations for the 
handicapped. 
Won 
1820-99 Lack of wheelchair access to Judicial Branch Buildings.  Lost (c) 
2197-99 INS (state insurance agency) lacks facilities for handicapped people. Lost (c) 
3430-99 MCJD (Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports) lacks adequate 
facilities for handicapped people.  
Lost (c) 
8386-99 BNCR (state bank) lacks facilities for handicapped to sign with a 
digital fingerprint. 
Lost (c) 
12062-01 Judicial Branch failed to respect the Law of Handicapped for 
Designations. 
Lost (c) 
107-01 Entry turnstiles on buses prevent handicapped from using the buses. Lost (c) 
12062-01 Judicial Branch failed to respect the Law of Handicapped for 
Designations. 
Lost (c) 
 Job discrimination against disabled people  
10637-00 A taxi concession was denied for being blind and to his/her mother 
for being older than 60 years. 
Lost (d) 
2432-01 Lost police job for being handicapped. Lost (d) 
8551-98 Blind woman was not considered for a job because of disability. Lost (c) 
 Freedom of Religion  
172-89 Protestant church was arbitrarily banned for excessive noise and 
annoyances. 
Won 
590-91 Preference for evangelical students at a Methodist School. Won 
3914-99 Against an image of Virgin Mary in school; appellant not catholic. Won 
8387-99 Against an image of Virgin Mary in school; appellant not catholic. Won 
787-00 Rights granted to Catholic priests serving jails were denied at jail to 
Evangelical priest 
Lost (d) 
2286-00 Individual prohibited from preaching at a marketplace. Won 







Table 3 (continued) 
10916-00 San José Municipality prohibits preachers in public places. Lost (c) 
797-01 JAPDEVA (Atlantic zone ports state agency) for contributions to the 
Catholic Church. 
Lost (e) 
1866-01 Tibás Municipality denied a permit for a Christian Congregation to 
have an activity at the park. 
Won 
6428-01 Rastafarians banned from “Oficentro La Sabana” (an office 
complex) 
Won 
2640-01 Health permissions are requested from Christian Congregations, 
while not to Catholic centers. 
Lost (c) 
 Ethnic Minorities  
1786-93 Identity meetings denied to indigenous people. Won 
2039-93 Public Registry not inscribes or accepts Oriental documents. Lost (e) 
6097-93 Labor discrimination against Black worker. Lost (c) 
2242-94 Fired by municipal government for political belief and race. Lost (c) 
3204-95 Discriminated against Black model. Lost (c) 
3220-95 Political Parties against Blacks. Lost (e) 
509-96 Against the required reading of a book with discriminatory content 
against Blacks.  
Lost (c) 
966-98 Entrance to a private bar denied to Black patron. Lost (c) 
5813-00 Discrimination against Black soccer player. Lost (c) 
5445-01 Publicity barred for discrimination against Blacks. Won 
 Women and gender discrimination  
2196-92 Husband’s consent required for a woman’s sterilization. Won 
3435-92 Equal rights for naturalization through marriage for Men and women  Won 
3444-92 Discrimination against female athletes. Lost (e) 
629-94 CCSS (social security agency) males refused social security benefits 
from family or wife 
Won 
2648-94 CCSS pays no benefits to men in common law marriages, if woman 
works. 
Won 
5311-96 Domestic violence law language that reads “man” should also be 
understood as “woman.” 
Lost (e) 
388-97 National Children’s Hospital refuses to allow men to take care of 
their children. 
Lost (d) 
5732-98 INA (vocational training state agency) has no programs for women, 
as indicated by law. 
Lost (c) 
6189-00 CCSS (social security agency) laboratory refused to hire a female 
worker. 
Lost (c) 
9196-00 Discrimination against pregnant women at work. Lost (c) 
11463-00 Son was not accepted at school for being from a single-mother. Lost (c) 
7513-01 BPDC (Workers’ bank) no quota for women on its Board of the 
National Assembly 
Lost (c) 





Table 3 (continued) 
3150-94 Against the 12 hour job for women who work in domestic services. Lost (c) 
2366-99 Representatives of women and of other political forces were 
disrespected.  
Lost (c) 
1086-02 TV commercial was stopped from being broadcasted for portraying 
demeaning image of women 
Lost (c) 
716-98 Protests the lack of woman to the Board of directors of the ARESEP 
(prince controlling agency) 
Won 
3419-01 Discrimination against women in elected positions. Lost (c) 
Source: Corte Suprema de Justicia-Sala Constitucional. 2004. 
Note: This table presents only some of the major cases; it is neither exhaustive nor complete. The 
creation of such a list is, at the moment, impossible as there more than 114,000 cases that would 
need to be read and coded.  
a. Case’s resolution number; the two numerals after the hyphen signify the year of the decision. 
b. Won Con lugar (ruled in favor of the action). 
c. Lost Sin lugar (ruled against the action). 
d. Lost Rechazado por razones de fondo (dismissal on the merits). 
e. Lost Rechazado de plano (plain dismissal). 
 
 
 
